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TECHNICAL ANALYSES AND LESSONS OF THE 
EMBANKMENT FAILURE AT THE AJKA RED MUD RESERVOIR 
 
József Mecsi 
University of Pécs, 
Pollack Mihály Faculty of Engineering and Information Technology 






This presentation aims at providing an informative fact-based description of the complex reasons resulting in dam 
ruptures. The investigations focus on the tragic damage of red mud reservoir No. 10 in Ajka and restrict itself to the 
engineering aspects of the damage. The analysis of the direct and indirect reasons for the tragic incident may serve as a 
lesson to our engineers and specialists as well as provide guidelines and revelations with the intention of improvement 
while emphasizing the necessity of deeper comprehension. Neither this presentation nor the engineering analyses aimed 





In Hungary three alumina plants have been built. One of them 
in the vicinity of Ajka town has been operational since 1942, 
and collected red mud in a reservoir in the valley of the Torna 
stream. The product of alumina production, 15.7 million m³ of 
red mud was deposited in 10 reservoirs in the valley of the 
Torna stream. The red mud is a waste product of the Bayer 
process. Bauxite is crushed and ground in mills and heated; 
alumina is precipitated by washing the bauxite with a hot 
solution of sodium hydroxide (NaOH) under pressure. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  The site and affected localities 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11491412) 
Around 24-45 percent of red mud is ferrous oxide (responsible 
for its reddish-brown color), but it also contains other metallic 
compounds. Red mud is not poisonous, but it is a hazardous 
material, due to its sodium hydroxide content. This highly 
alkaline (pH 12-13) material was transported by pipeline to 
reservoirs. 
On October 4, 2010 at 12:25 the northwestern part of the dam 
of red mud reservoir No. 10 has collapsed, and near one 
million m
3
 alkaline red mud mixed with water has plunged in 
the valley of the Torna stream. Fig. 1.–Fig5. The red mud 
flooded the valley-side parts of the village Kolontár and the 
town Devecser, then trough the Marcal river it has reached the 
river Danube in very short time. 10 people died, 123 injured, 
260 houses became uninhabitable, and significant ecological 
damage occurred.  
The presentation is based on a series of expert tests performed 
to examine the stability aspects of the embankments of 
reservoirs as required by the authorities (Mecsi, J. 2010-2012). 
The analysis shall not aim to examine the complex issue of 
deficiencies in plant operation or in the earlier management of 
the reservoir, neither shall it consider the measures to have 
been taken by the operating company or the authorities in 
order to minimize or to help recognize the risk of a 
catastrophic dam failure. 
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Fig. 2.  The corner of the North and the West with water 




Fig. 3.  The west and the north dam after the failure (index.hu, 


















2.GENERAL CONDITIONS  
 
The embankment of the reservoir in question must be 
examined as part of the entire reservoir system, as the different 
parts of the system have a mutual impact on each another. The 
mutual impact is primarily caused by the water pressure and 
the pressure exerted by the tailings, these constituting the 
largest part of the load. We must consider the fact that the 
entire reservoir system had been built on an extensive gravel 
terrace covered by a mixed composition of mud-clay-sand 
deposit of the periodical water flow of the 4-5 m Torna stream 
bed. 
The tragic dam failure of the north-western corner of reservoir 
No. 10 highlighted the importance of a complex analysis. 
Important aspects of the study are: 
 
• the geological-geotechnical conditions and the 
morphological properties of the area; 
• the conditions changed as a result of favorable technical 
interventions or technical interventions believed to be 
favorable;  
• the extreme weather, precipitation and dynamic wind load 
conditions;  
• the specific features of the substance stored in the 
reservoirs;  
• the resistance reducing effects of pressures due to the 
transition of the substance from a more favorable condition 
to an unfavorable state of liquefaction;  
• the different rigidity properties of the unfavorable 
embankment connections; 
• and several other factors that could not have been 
considered by earlier regulatory systems. 
 
Figure 7 shows an aerial photo of the interconnected system of 
reservoirs in its condition prior to the embankment failure. 
 




Fig. 7.  Overhead view of the reservoir system in an aerial 
photo of June 2010 
 
The present study does not aim to identify scapegoats of the 
incident. The findings and conclusions derived from the 
examinations may be further refined and supplemented in the 
future in light of further facts and data yet to be revealed. 
 
 
3. HYDROGRAPHICAL-HIDROGEOLOGY CONDITIONS  
 
The industrial plants and the red mud reservoirs are located in 
the 1-3 km wide eroded valley of the Torna stream. Figure 8 
shows the original morphology on the second military survey 
map (1852). The territory had a basin-like character, fill wit 
course gravel and sand and cover fine sand and silt, hence is 
had a swampy character, collected the water. Before reaching 
the town the stream flows in a regulated bed. The original 
streambed was below the red mud reservoirs No. 8-10, but the 
stream was diverted in the 1990s when the reservoirs were 
built. The damaged dam of red mud reservoir No. 10 had been 
built on swampy ground. Geo-morphologically they are 
defined by series of mountain margin Mesozoic horsts and 
bench lands with piedmont surfaces and mountain margin 
sedimentary deposits.  
Figure 8 shows the reservoir system after the failure by the 
aerial photo. From the picture you can see visually the 
reservoir system and the relationship with surrounding terrain.   




Fig. 8.  The site before the construction of reservoirs on the 




Fig. 9.  Picture and altitude figures of the reservoir system 
after the embankment failure in October 2010 
(http://redsludge.bm.hu) 
 
Figure 10 shows the site situation in the years 1970-1976. 
From No.1 to No.9. reservoirs were already in operation, most 
of the finished the filling with red-mud material, but the 
reservoir No. 10 was still in the planning stages. The bed of 
the Torna creek position was near to the west side of the dam. 
The idea was that reservoir area further expand to the northern 




Fig. 10.  The morphological map from the original 
documentation before the built the reservoir No. 10. The 
Torna stream’s bed position changes when the dams of the 
reservoir were built 
 
4. SUBSOIL CONDITIONS  
 
Figure 11 shows the subsoil conditions of the area based on 
detailed soil tests performed between 1975 and 1980.  
The reservoir system was built on the gravel terrace (“gravel 
basin”), in the 1-3 km wide eroded valley of the Torna stream. 
The gravel terrace 5-6 m deep sedimentary deposit. 
The deeper part of the “gravel basin” consist of the very 
permeable gravel with water permeability of k= 10
-1
 cm/sec. 
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Fig. 11.  Illustration of the subsoil conditions of the reservoir 
system based on the original plans (1975 year). (ny- 
groundwater level at rest ;k- coefficient of permeability; Ip- 
Index of plasticity)  
 
The gravel terraces are not homogeneous. This is illustrated by 
an exploratory borehole in different soil depths in soil samples 
analyzed in terms of particle size distribution curves. (Fig. 12) 
The geological origin, the gravel content increases with depth, 
diameter of the particles is not evenly spread, dominant in the 
fine sand of the same particle size range, which shows the 




Fig. 12.  Typical particle size distribution diagrams of the soil 
 
 
In the year 1989 soil excavations and geophysical 
measurements were conducted at the leg of reservoir No. 10.’s 
dam, and the  soil profiles were recorded. Figure 13 shows the 
soil profiles near the north-west corner of the reservoir No. 10, 
and the photo illustrates the testing locations. It is important to 
remark that near the north-west corner of reservoir No. 10  
sand-silt is to be found (the former Hungarian naming 
standards "flour sand" soil) and sandy-gravel layers above the 
fat clay. This "sand-floor" layer was 1.2 to 2.4 m thick. 
The storage space of such other part a similar unfavorable soil 
layer were not detected.  
 
On the right upper part of the Figure illustrates when 2011. in 
November created a drainage ditch, highlighting the 
liquefiable -unstable soil conditions. The trench sidewalls 





Fig. 13.  Soil profile near the West –North corner of the 
reservoir No. 10. The top right side of the figure shows the 
position of the soil investigations 
 
 
This soil layer unfavorable is that in fine sandy-silt fractions 
may move under higher water pressure conditions. As a result, 
grain size becomes coarser on the inner side, while a „clay 
plug” may develop towards the edge of areas in motion. Such 
a clay plug is characterized by a sudden movement under a 
significant change in pressure and consequently a mudflow-
like grain movement may evolve. Such a process may be 
extremely fast and unexpected.  
Figure 14 shows the typical results of the soil investigations 
by the boring logs after the failure. Compare with the earlier 
investigation results you can see that the instable fine sand-silt 
layer change to the red mud layer. 
It will readily be conceived that the characteristics of the 
subsoil underlying the hydraulically solidified slag–ash 
embankment constitute an important aspect of the stability of 
embankments. It is also important to examine whether the 
subsoil may become liquefied under larger water pressures 
The CPTu static penetration tests performed on October 7, 
2010 in the direct vicinity of the damage location did not show 
any resistance until a depth of 2 m, below which it indicated a 
sandy gravel layer of a thickness of 3 m. Fig.15. The value of 
peak resistance was 40-50 Mpa, which indicates a compacted 
condition. An extremely high water pressure value of su=500-
750 kPa was measured in the water bearing layers of sandy 
gravel and gravel, which equals to the water pressure of a 50-
70(!) m water column. Note: the order of magnitude of the 
measured value is significant even considering the fact that 
pore water pressure increases during CPTu penetration. 
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Fig. 14.  Soil investigation results after the failure of the dam. 
Boring logs- photo and plan with the soil investigation places, 
and compare the soil profile before the failure 
 
A clay-silt layer of very low resistance is located under the 
compacted gravel layer, which is extremely soft until a depth 
of 12 m, with a gradually increasing rigidness at larger depths. 
Pore water pressure in the clay layer is insignificant, which 
shows that it is the sandy gravel layer that was affected by an 




Fig. 15.  CPT test results 3 days after the failure 
 
It must be emphasized that although the sandy gravel–gravel 
soil layer of large bearing capacity is favorable in terms of 
potential subsidence, but at the same time it is unfavorable in 
terms of water pressures that may evolve in a system of 
communicating vessels. 
5. ALTITUDE CONDITIONS 
 
Figure 16 shows crown level heights of the embankments of 
Reservoir No. 10 in their condition before the embankment 
failure in October 2010. The boundary embankment is split 
into sections on the site plan and the altitude data are shown 
on a “developed” boundary line. 
The figure shows rather significant distortions as horizontal 
and altitude scales largely differ from each other. 
As it can be observed, the highest section of the dam crown is 
between points ‘D’ and ‘E’, i.e. at the embankment between 
Reservoirs No. 9 and 10, showing an altitude of 218,0-219 
mBf (meters above Baltic Sea level). 
The embankment at the northern side of Reservoir No. 10 is 
the lowest in altitude, sloping towards the west. The degree of 
slope is 1.3–1,5% (as the altitude difference of 1.2–1.4 m 
develops at a very long section). 
 
 




Fig. 17.  Photo of Reservoir No. 10 when the filling of red mud 
into the reservoir was at an early stage 
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The average crown level height is 217,3 mBf. and the 
difference between the lowest and the highest crown levels is 
2.5 m, which cannot be regarded as extreme considering the 
fact that the total length of the embankments is several 
kilometers. 
It can also readily be assumed that this embankment section 
had been meant to be constructed lower at the initial 
construction as it had been considered a temporary 
embankment, as an extension in northern direction had been to 
be built later, which is clearly confirmed by the original plans. 
The original photo – in which the level of red mud filled in the 
reservoir indicates the date when the picture was taken – also 
clearly shows that the embankment was lower when originally 
built (Figure 17.). 
Significant differences (4-6 m) is on the north side of the dam 
and the east side of the barrier thickness (25-27 m). The 
temporary dam was built on the north side, it is assumed that 
you have bought into the reservoir space for future expansion 
ideas as well. 
 
 
6. THE CLOSURE OF THE RESERVOIR SYSTEM  
 
Water pollution was detected in the groundwater monitoring 
wells near the reservoir system in the 1970s–1980s. In 
compliance with the regulatory requirements, a watertight 
slurry wall was constructed to close down the southern and the 
western sides of the reservoir. Later, as the pollution spread 
over towards the north, the construction of a new type of grout 
curtain was started around the reservoir system in 1999. The 
length of the grout curtain was 1045 m on the northern side, 
200 m on south side, and there were connected to the already 
existing slurry wall. Figure 18 shows the boundary structure 
around the reservoir system. The depth of the vertical closure 
was determined in relation to the depth of the watertight clay 
substratum, by minimum 1.0 m bellow it. The depth of the 
southern wall varies between 3.0 and 8.0 m, while 6.0-9.0-






Fig. 18.  Site plan of the slurry wall and grout observed in the 
1998 year (curtain boundary constructed at several stages)  
 
7. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMBANKMENT 
 
The boundary embankments show some special features. As 
they were made of slag and ash from the power plant, their 
weight is relatively low. Their average density is = 1.5-1.55 
gr/cm
3
, while their dry density is s= 0,7-0,8 gr/cm3.The 
embankment is quasi-saturated with water. Due to the 
hydraulic chemical bond, the embankment is characterized by 
a relatively large strength. As a result of the construction 
technology applied, the embankment is layered and is of 
inhomogeneous structure, which manifests both in its strength 
and its water permeability characteristics. Figure 19 shows a 
characteristic profile of the northern embankment of Reservoir 
No. 10 after the failure. 
Typical material tests were performed of the southern 
embankment by the Institute of Environmental Management 
of the University of Miskolc in November 2010. It must be 
noted that properties determined at the embankment of 
Reservoir No. 10/a may differ from the test results of the 
embankment of Reservoir No. 10, but in general, they give an 
approximate picture of the strength, water permeability and 
density properties of the embankment. The dam material is 
horizontally layered and is inhomogeneous in the sense that it 
is built up of layers of finer and coarser grain composition. 
The joint surfaces detected in core samples were located in the 
zones composed of coarser grains as the stability of zones with 
coarser grains is lower than that of layers built up of finer 
grains. 
The value of unidirectional compressive strength of the coarse 
grain samples was 0.5-0.8 MPa at deeper sampling locations, 
while it was significantly lower, 0.2-0.45 MPa closer to the 
surface. In the case of fine grain samples the value of 
unidirectional compressive strength was usually between 1.5-
2.5 MPa and in some extraordinary cases it reached as much 




Fig. 19. Material of the northern embankment of Reservoir 
No. 10 after the embankment failure (photo: Dr. Tibor 
Horváth, November 2010) 
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Breaking strength values were around 4.5-6 kN at failures 
along the edge in the coarser and finer beds. In highly 
stratified zones composed of coarse grains, breaking force was 
as low as 2.5-4 kN, while in well preserved samples of the 
best bearing capacity, values of as much as 10 kN and in some 
cases 15 kN were observed. 
In general, the core samples show good compressive and 
tensile strength in their natural condition, their unidirectional 
compressive strength being around 1.5 MPa, while in the case 
of failure along the edge the compressive strength at the centre 
line is calculated at 0.9 MPa and the tensile strength is of an 
average value of 0.3 MPa. The samples are of low hydraulic 
conductivity, falling in the range of mud–muddy clay–clay. 
Test results show that the typical seepage factor of the samples 
was within the range of 10
-9–10-8 m/s but in the case of a few 
samples values higher or lower than this range were measured, 
at 5,8•10-10 – 2,5•10-7 m/s. In light of the above, the coarse-
grain layers of low bearing capacity practically showed the 
seepage factor of a mud soil, while the more compact layers 
had that of fat clay. The impermeability of samples drops 
along with the decrease of grain size and thus along with the 
growth of total porosity. When a sudden increase of tension 
was exerted on the samples, they lost approximately third of 
their strength. However, no correlation was found between the 
size of the compression wave and the loss of strength within 
the range of 4-8 bars.” 
 
8. PROPERTIES OF THE “RED MUD”  
 
“Red mud” is a by-product of alumina production, in the 
process of which bauxite is processed using the Bayer process. 
Bauxite is crushed and ground in mills and heated; alumina is 
precipitated by washing the bauxite with a hot solution of 
sodium hydroxide under pressure. “Red mud” is then gained 
from the remaining solution by settling and filtering. 
The properties of “red mud” are reviewed drawing on past 
experience in a very informative article about the geotechnical 
aspects of hydraulic spoil banks (Asbóth, János – Szivák, 
Attila: Geotechnical aspects of hydraulic spoil banks, Civil 
Engineering Review, Volume XXXII, issue 12/1982, pp. 538-
546). The statements of the article were later confirmed by the 
findings of tests performed later. „The Fe2O3 content of red 
mud is high and therefore material density is also higher than 
in average clays: it is s =2,9–3,3gr/cm3. The value of water 
content varies within the range of w=150– 200 %. Bulk 
density is =1,3–1,5gr/cm3 in freshly settled clay and = 1,5–
1, 7 gr/cm
3
 in clay settled for years. 
Comparing the material density and the bulk density data it 
can be stated that the substance stored in the red mud reservoir 
is of extremely loose structure. In its fresh condition the void 
ratio of the clay varies between e = 4–6, while it is between 2–
4 in spoil banks settled and abandoned for years.” 
The extraordinary volume changing character is shown by the 
fact that after the desiccation of its surface, cracks of 3-8 cm 
appear on it (Figure 20). In spite of the fact that the cracks 
penetrate into a depth of as much as a meter, the substance is 
characterized by a creamy consistency only a few millimeters 
under the surface. 
 
 
Fig. 20. The extraordinary volume changing character after 
the desiccation of red-mud surface, cracks of 3-8 cm appear 
on it (Surface of the “red mud” in dry condition (photo: J. 
Mecsi) 
 
Corresponding liquid limit and plasticity index values in a 
Casagrande plasticity chart shows that the points plotted fall 
into the range of organic substances without exception. The 
description of the substance as „red mud” is not appropriate in 
terms of soil mechanics, as considering plasticity index, it 
belongs to the group of substances of medium to high 
plasticity according and should be described as medium and 
fat clay. 
The following questions arise: 
• What special characteristics determine the behaviour of 
the substance if it is defined as medium and fat clay, 
and it is to be regarded as a near-watertight material 
according to its permeability coefficient? 
• Why can we not expect that the substance, as a 
watertight material, will prevent water seepage at the 
bottom of the reservoir and near its wall? 
 
“Shear strength tests were performed with an airfoil shear 
probe. Examining the test results it can be stated that the 
authoritative shear strength is 10 kN/m
2
 on the settling area 
currently in use, which approximately corresponds with the 
triaxial test results. Shear strength tests performed in the 
abandoned spoil bank showed more diffuse results than those 
in the currently used one, but the authoritative value was 
around 10 kN/m
2
 there, too.  
These tests also confirmed that “red mud” does not lose its 
water content and its shear strength does not increase along 
with the time passing.” 
Chemical effects, such as that of sodium hydroxide added to 
the swollen clay in the course of the technological process, 
may also have a role in the special behavior of “red mud”. 
 
It can conclusively be stated that the substance shows special 
thixotropic behavior, it does not easily lose its water content 
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9. PRECIPITATION DATA BETWEEN 2000 AND 2010 
 
Fig.21 shows a graphic presentation of the precipitation data 
provided in a table by the Weather Data Services Department 
of the National Weather Service on October 8, 2010.  
 
 
Fig. 21. Total precipitation data in the 1st– 3rd quarter year 
between 2000 and 2010. The figure shows data from two 
observation places near the investigated territory 
 
Comparing the total precipitation of the period between 
January and the end of September 2010 with that of 2009, a 
44% increase can be observed, while comparing the same with 
2008 data, the increase in precipitation is 74%. This volume of 
water is rather significant considering the character of the 
drainage basin. The volume of total precipitation in the period 
between January and the end of September 2010 is more than 
one and a half times higher than the 10-year average (154%). 
 
 
10. GROUNDWATER LEVEL AND WATER PRESSURE 
MONITORING DATA  
 
The surface levels and the ground water levels observed in the 
area of the entire reservoir system. The initial water level at 
Reservoirs No. 6 and 7 was between 210-215 m. above the 
Baltic See (mBf.) according to the monitoring performed in 
2011 (Budapest University of Technology, Geotechnical 
Department, March 2011), while the highest water pressure 
level observed at Reservoir No. 10 was 197,4 mBf on the 
northern side and 191,5 mBf on the southern side According 
to the above data, the difference in water pressure level is 15-
17 m, with an additional 9.5 m between the northern and the 
southern parts of Reservoir No. 10. The above data were 
gained during a period of very low precipitation in 2011, while 
in 2010 precipitation was especially high. In light of the 
above, it can be concluded that the boundary walls constructed 
around the reservoir system due to environmental reasons in 
accordance with the requirements of the authorities had a very 
unfavorable effect, as a result of which the system could 
gather a very significant amount of precipitation in 2009-2010, 
which resulted in extremely high differences in water level 
and therefore extremely high differences in water pressure. 
 
11. WIND SPEED AND WIND DIRECTIONS  
 
The prevailing wind direction in the vicinity of Reservoir No. 
10 is northern–north-western as shown in the wind direction 
frequency chart. Wind parallel with the direction of the 
embankment failure is very rare (Figure 22).  
Peculiar wind conditions were observed in the area between 
September 25 and October 4. Between October 1 and 4, a 
gradually strengthening, unfavorable wind speed toward the 
direction of the embankment failure was accompanied by 
casual wind gusts (Weather data services, National weather 




Fig. 22. Vectors of prevailing wind directions and wind speeds 
between September 25, 2010 and October 4, 2010 (Weather 




Fig. 23. Effects of the wind speeds between September 25 and 
October 4, 2010 
 
The observations of the wind direction and velocity were at 10 
m over the ground surface, but the top surface of the reservoir 
is 23-24m. It is mean that the wind velocity in site should be 
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significant more than the measured value. The highest wind 
speed values were measured on October 4, with an average of 
22 km/h and occasion wind gusts of 60 km/h. 
There is reason to assume that these unusual wind direction 
and wind speed conditions contributed to the development of 
the embankment failure. In addition, the possible sucking 
effect of the wind on the northern side of the embankment 
must also be taken into consideration. Fig. 23. 
 
12. SATELLITE MONITORING DATA  
 
Following the embankment failure, the Satellite Geodetic 
Observatory (KGO) of the Institute of Geodesy, Cartography 
and Remote Sensing (FÖMI) published its monitoring data in 
respect of Reservoir No. 10 on the internet. “InSAR study of 
the failed red mud reservoir near Kolontár, Figure 24. 
It can be concluded from the monitoring data that the 
maximum range of the values measured was 1–1.3 cm/year 
and it showed a steady, gradually increasing tendency. At a 
few locations however a lower increase of a total value of 1.0–












Fig. 24. Summary of the satellite monitoring data 
[DigitalGlobe, Sample Imagery Gallery, Earth explorer: U.S. 
Geological Survey http://edcsns17.cr.usgs.gov/EarthExplorer/ 
(2011), Satellite Geodetic Observatory (KGO) of the Institute 
of Geodesy, Cartography and Remote Sensing (FÖMI)] 
 
 
The range of subsidence and movements is not significant but 
is indicative and can primarily originate from the “unsettled” 
behavior of the soil underlying the dam. Even considering 
measurement inaccuracy, the values measured cannot be 
regarded significant. 
At locations 4a, b and c the subsidence of the embankment 
was 80 mm/7 years, i.e. 12-13 mm/year.  
At locations 2a, b and c a slight rising of the embankment was 
experienced along a four-year period starting in 2003; the 
movement was later stabilized and the embankment 
occasionally rose but only to a very slight extent. 
At locations 3a, b and c the total value of subsidence was 60 
mm within a period of 7 years, which indicates an annual 
subsidence of 8 mm. 
 
Monitoring data show a realistic range of values and further 
confirm the conclusions of the analysis. Furthermore, they 
verify the lengthy seepage process and washout of fine grains 
under the dam. 
 
 
13. CIRCUMSTANCES AND COMPLEX CAUSES  
 
The area is located in the lowest part of the drainage basin of 
the Torna stream, i.e. in the valley of the stream. In its original 
condition, the area, together with the subsurface stream valley 
formed a surface and subsurface water flow unit which was 
very sensitive to weather conditions. The area had been 
gradually involved in and shaped by industrial operations, 
through the construction of surface and subsurface structures. 
The northern, so called intermediate embankment of Reservoir 
No. 10, constructed in a smaller size with a view to the 
possible extension of the reservoir system, served as an 
external, i.e. boundary embankment. As a result, it was the 
surface run-off and flow conditions that were first changed 
significantly by the industrial use of the area in the stream 
valley. 
It can be concluded that according to an engineering approach 
to finding the causes, the failure of the rigid embankment of 
large bearing capacity was a combined result of a number of 
unfavourable conditions. 
The base width of the northern embankment is significantly 
different from the size of the other embankments, as it was 
considered a temporary structure, bearing in mind the 
possibility of a future extension. The slightly more than 20 m 
height of the solid part of the embankment is lower than the 




Fig. 25. Dimensions of the western and southern dams 
 
Paper No. 3.47a              10 
Its effect manifested at the northern embankment – being by 
25 m less in base width than the western embankment – as the 
resistance against displacement here was significantly lower, 
and also because the rigidity of the western and northern 
embankments showed significant difference at an 
unfavourable connection at the corner of the reservoir. 
We concluded, that at the connection of the stronger west dam 
and softer north dam a very big tensile force could occur, 
while at the middle of the north dam big torsion force 




Fig. 26. The cracking at the middle of the north dam 
 
The deformed, distorted northern dam after the catastrophic 
rupture, was not at rest. 
Fissures started developing on the crown level of the northern 
dam section at a gradually increasing pace 3 days after the 
dam failure, following which the embankment subsided in 30-
40 m pieces, with 20-30 cm settlements. Fig 27.  
The leaking red mud stored in the reservoir left a crater by the 
inner side of the embankment, as a result of which the foot of 






Fig. 27. Picture of the North dam of the reservoir No. 10 on 




Fig. 28. The damaged reservoir of an alumina plant is seen 
from the air near the village of Kolontar, Hungary, Monday, 
Oct. 11, 2010. AP / Abel Szalontai  
 
The geotechnical conditions were determined by the fact that 
at the northern boundary embankment of the reservoir there 
are beds of easily liquefiable muddy fine sand (or sand flour as 
described earlier) in a layer of 3-4 m located in the closest 
vicinity of the critical corner of the reservoir, adjacent to a 
sandy-gravelly layer. 
Significant pore water pressure may have developed in the soil 
layer underlying the embankment as a result of the geological 
properties of the enclosed gravel terrace functioning as a 
drainage basin and due to extremely high precipitation levels 






Fig. 29. Summarizing some effects for the dam failure 
 
The increase of load on the slope surface of the embankment 
might have contributed to the excess load – and the increase of 
soil stress – in the subsoil on the inner side and as a 
consequence, to excess subsidence, while it probably caused a 
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slighter rate of expansion on the outer side due to the rigid 
body like movement of the embankment.  
The uneven layer structure of the subsoil might have 
contributed to the possible development of torsion loading at 
the northern embankment, which is indicated by cracks. 
The extremely rigid but light embankment and the soft, 
liquefiable subsoil provided highly unfavourable static 
conditions.  
The liquefaction property and special thixotropic behavior of 
the “red mud” may have also contributed to the disaster. 
Chemical effects, such as that of sodium hydroxide added to 
the swollen clay in the course of the technological process, 
may also have a role in the special behavior of “red mud”.  
The extremely unfavorable wind direction and wind speed 
conditions may have given a final push toward the very 
sudden embankment failure. 
It is also an important factor for the stability of the dam, that 
by what kind of filling technology is used. In what magnitude 
and distribution of water heights may occur within the area of 
the reservoir? 
The list of contributing factors could be further extended and 
it will readily be conceived that it is the accumulation of 
unfavourable conditions that led to the sudden rupture of the 
embankment. 
 
The present study does not aim to identify scapegoats of the 
incident. The findings and conclusions derived from the 
examinations may be further refined and supplemented in the 
future in light of further facts and data yet to be revealed. 
 
 
14. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The present study aims to provide a background to a non-
exhaustive list of factors contributing to the embankment 
failure, while attempting to give a clear picture of the complex 
technical conditions. 
The rupture of the embankment and the highly serious disaster 
emerging thereof serve as a lesson in several aspects for 
professionals performing technical or legislative tasks, as well 
as for those working in the area of the administration of justice 
and performing official control duties. 
It is not an aim of the present study to identify scapegoats for 
the incident.  
 
The findings and conclusions derived from the examinations 
may be further refined and supplemented in the future in light 
of further facts and data yet to be revealed. 
 
The objective of the author of the present analysis is, led by 
deep sympathy for the victims and those who suffered damage, 
to provide an insight into the technical causes and the 
circumstances of the tragic incident, as well as to promote, 
with a humble approach to sciences, all endeavors to avoid 
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